Zhou Yongkang’s Network of Corruption

For over thirty years, Zhou Yongkang appeared a quintessential Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member, quickly rising through party ranks, while creating hundreds of beneficial personal and financial relationships.

But on December 6, 2014, Zhou’s life as a revered public figure ended. He was expelled from the CCP and arrested on charges of “serious violations of party discipline, accepting large sums of bribes, disclosing party and state secrets, and committing adultery with several women.”

Zhou’s arrest is significant for two reasons. First, it broke the unspoken rule of immunity for former and current Politburo Standing Committee members. This rule, in place since the end of the Cultural Revolution, once fostered political unity among the CCP’s highest officials. Second, Zhou’s exposed financial activities revealed how he was able to capture large swaths of China’s government and economy for his own benefit.

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In 1964, Zhou Yongkang joined the CCP while he was a student at the Beijing Petroleum Institute (now known as China University of Petroleum). After graduating from the Survey and Exploration Department in 1966, Zhou entered the workforce as a technician at the Heilongjiang oil field, where he worked until 1970.

From 1970–1973, Zhou held his first leadership role as CCP Secretary (party secretary) of the Liaohe Oil Exploration Bureau’s Geological Survey Regiment. The Liaohe oil field would later become one of many oil provinces developed and operated by state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

In 1973, Zhou began his climb up the ranks of the Liaohe Oil Exploration Bureau. From 1973–1976, he was director of the bureau’s geophysical survey division. In 1976, he was promoted to deputy director of their political department. This combination of technical and political experience enabled him to become the geophysical survey division’s party secretary and commander in 1979. In 1983, Zhou gained his first dual state-party title when he became director general and deputy party secretary of the overall Liaohe Oil Exploration Bureau, marking his first real power stronghold.

In 1984, Zhou was appointed to his first state position as mayor of Liaoning Province’s Panjin City, where the Liaohe oil field is located. At the same time, he was appointed Panjin’s deputy party secretary, giving him considerable control over both the city’s oil and political interests.

In 1985, he returned to oil as he was promoted to vice minister of the Petroleum Industry. He remained until 1988, when the ministry was dissolved and re-established as CNPC. In addition to his official state position, he was a party member of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry’s CCP Leading Party Group. Again, this was a powerful combination of positions, building Zhou’s stature and the party’s influence on China’s strategic sectors.

From 1998–1999, Zhou led the Ministry of Land and Resources, controlling approvals for all of China’s land and mines.

From 1999–2002, he was Sichuan party secretary and then transitioned to the state security sector. From 2002–2007, he served as public security minister. From 2002–2012, he also served on the CCP Central Committee’s Politics and Law Commission, working his way up the CCP’s Politburo. From 2007–2012, he was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest echelon of CCP politics. He retired in 2012.

On April 3, 2015, at age 73, Zhou was sentenced to life in prison for corruption, abuse of power, and leaking state secrets. The official Xinhua statement described how Zhou abused his power as a state and party official to enrich family members, associates, and himself, “resulting in serious losses of state-owned assets.” Court records have documented that Zhou directly accepted $118,000 in bribes. The real beneficiaries were his wife and son, whose assets totaled $300 million, $20 million of which prosecutors confirmed were accepted with Zhou’s knowledge.

According to Caixin, Li Chuncheng, was Zhou’s favorite subordinate during his time in Sichuan. In October 2012, Li Chuncheng was the first senior official to be targeted under Xi’s anticorruption campaign. Li’s trial in April 2015 is considered a watershed moment – a warning to Xi’s opponents that no one would be overlooked.

Under Zhou’s leadership, Li served as deputy party secretary of Sichuan’s capital, Chengdu City. In 2002, when Zhou left Sichuan to become public security minister, Li was appointed mayor and then deputy party secretary, which allowed Zhou to maintain ties to his powerbase.

Consequently, there was no surprise when Li Chuncheng implicated Zhou Yongkang, confessing during his April 2015 trial that he had “violated rules” in order to do Zhou’s bidding. Li claimed he was the middleman for the Zhou family’s interests in Sichuan’s oil and construction industries. As middleman, he was well rewarded. From 2001-2011, Li and his wife accepted more than $6 million in bribes.

While working in government, Li Chuncheng worked closely with Guo Yongxiang and Li Chongxi (unrelated). Both associates were sentenced to jail for corruption. In fact, Li Chongxi was a leading force within a political faction in Sichuan’s Ziyang city. Loosely grouped as the Ziyang faction, six officials have been arrested or sentenced for corruption. (1)

Li also developed his own network of businessmen who provided favors and perks in return for insider advantages. For instance, when Li was Chengdu’s deputy party secretary, local developer Deng Hong personally funded a three million yuan ($480,411) project to move the Li family’s ancestral graves and hold a memorial ceremony. In return, at a 2008 public auction, Deng paid only 7.9 million yuan ($1.15 million) per hectare for land that a Caixin source has valued at 29.9 million yuan ($4.37 million) per hectare.

In February 2013, Deng was accused of illegal land transfers, tax evasion and loan fraud in the Chengdu development project. Other implicated businessmen who are all under investigation include Wang Junlin, chairman of liquor maker Sichuan Langjiu Group Co.; Zhang Jun, chairman of Chengdu Construction Engineering Group; and Xing Ping, chairman of Chengdu Hi-Tech Investment Group.

Arrested in December 2012, Li was sentenced to thirteen years in prison by Hubei province’s Xianning court on October 12, 2015. Li received a less severe sentence in return for his cooperation and his confession that he accepted approximately 19.8 million yuan ($3.1 million) in bribes.

(1) Ziyang faction members: Sichuan Province Deputy Secretary Li Chongxi, Ziyang CCP Municipal Committee Secretary General Li Jia, Ziyang Mayor Deng Quanzhong, former National People’s Congress Deputy Luo Qinhong, Ziyang Vice Mayor Zhao Yongtao, and Ziyang Vice Mayor and Public Security Bureau Director Chen Zhengquan.

Bo Xilai’s fall is considered by many the catalyst for Zhou Yongkang’s investigation. While there is no evidence that Bo benefitted financially, Bo and Zhou were close political allies.

It is believed the two met in 2007, when Bo was appointed party secretary of Sichuan Province’s Chongqing City. The nature of their ties was revealed during Zhou’s investigation. During the run up to the 2012 leadership transition, Zhou attempted to preserve his powerbase by recommending Bo as his successor in order to position him as China’s next leader. However, the CCP leadership had already selected Xi Jinping as the next president and CCP secretary general.

In 2012, Zhou warned Bo that the central leadership had decided to remove the latter from power and launch a corruption investigation. According to Reuters’ sources, the state secrets charge was based on this warning. In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court of China annual report stated that Zhou and Bo “trampled on rule by law, wrecked party unity and engaged in non-organizational political activities.” In effect, they were accused of attempting to change the political status quo.

On September 22, 2013, Bo was sentenced to life in prison for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power. In contrast to the staged court proceedings of previous fallen officials, Bo denied all three charges and filed for an appeal. Due to the CCP’s control over China’s judicial system, Bo’s appeal was rejected and the high court in Shandong finalized his life sentence one month later.

President Xi’s decision to go after Zhou Yongkang’s vast network was endorsed by former Presidents Zeng Qihong and Jiang Zemin, mutual political patrons. Many believe Xi considered this course of action necessary to neutralize the political threat posed by Zhou, even after his retirement.

Huang and Zhou Yongkang worked together from 1999–2002. During this period, Huang was Neijiang City’s party secretary. He reported directly to Zhou, who was Sichuan party secretary and in charge of the greater Sichuan province. In early 2002, Huang was promoted to Sichuan’s vice governor, eleven months before Zhou left the province to serve as public security minister.

Huang Xiaoxiang was fired on July 17, 2015. While details remain sketchy, state media reports claim that the CCDI may charge him with adultery and moral degeneracy.

Huang’s removal has been linked to the firing of two of Zhou’s close Sichuan associates: former Sichuan Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Li Chongxi and former Sichuan People’s Congress Vice-Chairman Guo Yongxiang.

Guo Yongxiang met Zhou Yongkang in 1990, when they worked together at the Shengli Petroleum Administration Bureau, where Zhou was party secretary and director general. From 1998–2000, Guo Yongxiang then served as Zhou’s senior secretary (a position equivalent to chief of staff) at the Ministry of Land and Resources. From 2000–2002, Guo continued to work for Zhou, who was then Sichuan party secretary.

In 2002, Zhou left Sichuan to head the Ministry of Public Security. Guo stayed in Sichuan and was appointed vice governor in charge of forestry and water projects in 2006. It was during Guo’s tenure that Zhou Yongkang’s son Zhou Bin and Wu Bing secured approval for a major hydropower project in Sichuan.

In 2010, Guo’s son, Guo Lianxing, formed Beijing Huirun Yangguang Energy Technology Co., Ltd. in partnership with Beijing Huisheng Yangguang Investment Co. The latter was jointly owned by Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law and Mi Xiaodong, a former China National Offshore Oil Corporation official and Zhou Bin’s college roommate.

After an initial investigation in June 2013, the CCDI found the elder Guo abused his power to benefit his son’s business. During the same month, the registration for Beijing Huisheng Yangguang Investment Co. was canceled. On October 1, 2013, Mi Xiaodong was detained by the CCDI.

On April 9, 2014, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced that Guo Yongxiang was officially under investigation for taking bribes. On the same day, Guo was expelled from the CCP. On July 22, 2015, he stood trial at Yichang Intermediate People’s Court. A year before his trial, a source close to Guo described him “as the eyes and ears of Zhou Yongkang, and at times his go-between.”

On October 13, 2015, Hubei Province’s Yichang Intermediate People’s Court found Guo guilty of accepting 43.2 million yuan ($6.8 million) in bribes and possessing 36.14 million yuan ($5.7 million) in unaccountable income.

In January 2014, Liang Ke was detained based on charges of illegal activity. According to Reuters, Zhou directed Liang to bug and conduct surveillance on top leaders at the18th Party Congress in 2012. Those monitored included Wen Jiabao and his successor Premier Li Keqiang. Allegedly, Liang was told to collect evidence of corruption among China’s incoming leadership. Liang also enlisted the help of aides to gather information on party members.

Liang’s motive for assisting Zhou is unknown. Media sources frequently mention Liang Ke as belonging to the political faction within Zhou Yongkang’s network. This faction consisted of Liang Ke, former vice minister of public security Li Dongsheng, and former vice chairman of the Hubei Provincial People’s Congress Wu Yongwen.

On August 21, 2015, Li Dongsheng was charged with corruption. According to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Li abused his official power by accepting bribes in return for granting special favors throughout his tenure at the state-run China Central Television (CCTV), Ministry of Public Security, and the CCP’s Central Politics and Law Commission. Zhou Yongkang led two of these three organizations.

After graduating from Fudan University’s journalism department, Li worked at CCTV for over twenty years. He also served as deputy director of the CCP Central Committee’s propaganda department.

Like other Zhou associates, Li advanced Zhou Yongkang’s interests in return for career advancement. For instance, in 2009, despite Li’s lack of law enforcement background, Zhou appointed him vice minister of public security.

Li continued to leverage his influence within CCTV after transitioning to his role as public security vice minister. Beginning in 2010, Li repeatedly stated he wanted to buy his daughter a property in Britain to spiritual guru-turned-businessman Cao Yongzheng. In 2011, Cao instructed his daughter Karmia Chan Cao, who was then a student at Stanford University, to transfer $370,000 to Li’s daughter. Li Dongsheng returned the favor within the year by having CCTV-3 Director Zhang Xiaohai air Karmia’s musical play on September 10. Director Zhang later testified, “If it was not for Li, the show would definitely not have been on CCTV.”

Charges against Li Dongsheng also include using his influence to help his younger brother Li Fusheng secure six advertising deals through Li Ming (unrelated), former head of Beijing New Remington Advertising Co. Ltd. When Li Ming first met the older Li when he was working at CCTV in 1996, the businessman struck a deal that allowed New Remington to profit from prime ad slots for nineteen years. Consequently, Li Ming obliged Li Donghseng’s request to “take care” of his younger brother fourteen years later. From 2010–2013, Li Fusheng’s six advertising deals generated 15 million yuan ($2.5 million).

In January 2014, Beijing News reported that Li had facilitated Luliang City Mayor Ding Xuefeng’s political rise within Sichuan province. The China Business Journal reported that Zhou Bin had also contributed to Ding’s mayoral campaign fund in 2012. In other words, Zhou’s son and subordinate worked together to build political clout with Ding, who was well-positioned to return the favor once he became a Sichuan mayor.

On August 21, 2015, Li Dongsheng was indicted for accepting bribes and stood trial in Tianjin Second Intermediate Court on October 14, 2015. Three months later, Li was sentenced to 15 years in jail for accepting 22 million yuan ($3.5 million) in bribes. Court records state that Li Dongsheng kept 5 million yuan ($760,000) for himself and transferred the rest to his younger brother.

Vice President Zeng Qinghong was Zhou’s patron, shepherding Zhou’s rise from the oil industry to the central government. They met in the 1980s, when Zeng, then Liaohe director general, inspected the oil field. A 2009 Brookings Institution report claims that Zeng helped Zhou secure the following appointments: minister of land and resources (1998), Sichuan party secretary (1999), minister of public security (2002), and Politburo member and secretariat of the Sixteenth CCP Central Committee (2002).

Zeng retired in 2008, ending direct political connections to Zhou. However, he maintained indirect ties through Zhou Bin’s business partner, Wu Bing (also known as Wu Yongfu and Li Ruochen). Records show that Wu had “overlapping business interests” with Zeng’s family in Fantasia Holdings, a Hong Kong-listed development firm. Zeng’s niece, Zeng Baobao, owned the controlling share of Fantasia Holding, while Wu Bing and Zhou Bin’s Zhongxu company owned 10% of the company.

Reuters claimed that Zeng proposed investigating Zhou Yongkang, believing his former protégé was a political risk to the collective leadership. In an interesting turn of events, the Financial Times speculated in February 2015 that Zeng may be the next big “tiger” taken down in the anti-corruption campaign.

Jiang Jiemin was CEO and chairman of CNPC from 2007–2008, before becoming chairman of subsidiary PetroChina in 2011. Jiang’s April 2015 trial was the first time officials publicly linked Zhou Yongkang to the vast corruption network that would be exposed in subsequent cases.

From 1993–1994, Jiang was Zhou’s deputy director at the Petroleum Administration’s Shengli oil field. In 1998, when Zhou became the central government’s minister of land and resources, Jiang became Zhou’s link to the oil industry. At his trial, Jiang was charged with influencing the approval of oil projects between 2004 and 2008 based on Zhou Yongkang’s instructions. One of the projects was a controversial $6 billion refinery and petrochemical project in Sichuan Province (where Zhou Yongkang served as party secretary from 1999–2002). A Reuters report quoted a CNPC official stating, “Jiang backed the [Sichuan] plant because he wanted to please political leaders.”

A Caixin source stated that the investigation included examining Jiang’s sign-off on Changqing oil field deals that involved Zhou Bin and his mother-in-law, Zhan Minli. Jiang was also accused of leading “overly aggressive” overseas deals in coordination with PetroChina Vice President Bo Qiliang, who is also under investigation.

Jiang also helped Zhou consolidate his influence outside the oil industry. In March 2012, the son of Hu Jintao’s chief of staff was killed in the infamous “Ferrari Incident.” The young man recklessly drove his Ferrari Spider into an overpass wall, killing one woman and seriously injuring another. Seeing this as an opportunity to control President Hu’s top aide, Zhou ordered Jiang to buy the silence of the victim and surviving family. Reuters sources claim that Jiang paid the family millions of yuan in CNPC funds.

After Zhou retired in November 2012, Jiang’s future seemed assured. In March 2013, he was promoted to head the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). However, Jiang’s promotion was really a move by the central leaders to remove Jiang from his power base and prevent interference with the corruption investigations.

During the run up to Jiang’s trial, Xinhua described “a clique culture [that] has become deep-rooted” and “created the soil for collective corruption, especially in monopolized sectors such as oil.”

Six months later, Jiang was indicted for corruption. During a highly-choreographed, one-day trial in April 2015, Jiang pleaded guilty to taking 13.99 million yuan ($2.25 million) in bribes, accumulating 14.92 million yuan ($2.4 million) in unaccountable assets, and abusing his powers as a state company employee. Xinhua’s trial report revealed that from 2004–2013, Jiang had accepted the bribes directly or through his wife. His actions directly violated PetroChina’s “code of ethics,” which “prohibited the acceptance of gifts ‘of a value that may tend to influence business decisions or compromise independent judgment’ by senior management, along with their close family members.”

In November 2014, U.S. investors filed a class action suit against PetroChina for violating U.S. securities laws by concealing “bribery, corruption, and undisclosed related party transactions.” The suit names three PetroChina executives as main defendants: Jiang Jiemin, Li Hualin, and Ran Xinquan. All three have since been investigated for corruption in China.

The U.S. investors accused PetroChina of falsely claiming in its annual reports that the company enforced adequate internal controls against corruption. The investors sought to recover losses from devalued PetroChina securities, claiming the decline in share prices was a result of the company’s deeply ingrained culture of corruption.

According to court records, PricewaterhouseCoopers audited PetroChina’s internal controls and found no deficiencies. On August 3, 2015, Manhattan Judge Edgardo Ramos dismissed the case based on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide specific instances of corrupt practices that disproved PetroChina’s claims of corporate compliance.

In China, after a three-year investigation, Hubei Province’s Hanjiang Court sentenced Jiang to 16 years in prison on October 12, 2015. The court stated that Jiang was guilty of accepting approximately 14 million yuan ($2.21 million) in bribes from 2004 and 2013. In a clear acknowledgement of Jiang’s ties with Zhou, the court also stated that Jiang influenced business deals based on directions from Zhou.

Li Hualin and Zhou Yongkang first built their “bureaucratic associations” during their overlapping terms at the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. From 1983–1987, Li worked in the ministry’s development office (1983–1987) under then Vice Minister Zhou. As an example of how Zhou leveraged his bureaucratic associations for personal benefit, he had Li arrange for his son, Zhou Bin, to be admitted to Southwest Petroleum University, Li’s alma mater.

After the ministry was disbanded and re-established as CNPC in 1988, Zhou Yongkang was appointed CNPC deputy general manager (and deputy party secretary). Li Hualin was appointed to the newly established CNPC general office, where he served as Zhou Yongkang’s secretary from 1988–1992.

In interviews, CNPC personnel claim that Li had limited skills and his upward career progression was due, almost entirely, to his role as Zhou’s secretary. For instance, Li was unexpectedly promoted to deputy head of CNPC’s overseas Houston office in March 1992. One year later, Zhou Bin was sent to earn his MBA at the University of Texas at Dallas. It is widely believed that Li’s overseas promotion was arranged to coincide with Zhou Bin’s time in Texas, becoming the younger Zhou’s unofficial caretaker during his time in the United States.

From 1995-2000, as general manager of PetroChina International’s Canadian branch, Li focused on overseas oil exploration and development projects. From 2001–2007, he served at the Hong Kong branch.

Over the years, Li Hualin kept in touch with the younger Zhou. In 2008, Li was seen with Zhou Bin at a signing party for oil tycoon Wang Letian’s purchase of Shaanxi Degan Petroleum Technology Ltd., an oil company owned by Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law.

In July 2013, Li was promoted to CNPC deputy general manager, the position held by Zhou when they met in 1983. One month later, Li was detained for corruption and later dismissed from the party.

Tao Yuchun was a crucial figure in the investigation against Li Hualin and CNPC. Tao, who held key positions in CNPC and three other affiliated state owned companies, is suspected of being a key handler of the illicit funds connected to Li and CNPC. Tao and Li worked in tandem throughout their careers. While Li served as China Petroleum Hong Kong (Holding) Limited’s vice manager, Tao was a branch manager. After Li became chairman of the Shenzhen Petroleum board, Tao became general manager. During Li’s tenure as chairman, Tao was his most trusted lieutenant, later replacing him. In April 2015, Tao was tried for charges including corruption, abuse of power, and accepting bribes. In total, he is accused of stealing 300 million yuan ($48.24 million).

While many news reports identify Wang Yongchun as Zhou’s former aide, little is known about their relationship. A BBC profile on Zhou identifies Wang as Zhou’s trusted aide at the Daqing oil field in the late 1960s.

It is more likely that they met in the 1980’s when Wang was at PetroChina’s Jillin Exploration and Development Research Institute. From 1983–1999, he rose from president’s assistant to vice president and, ultimately, president. During this same period, Zhou was deputy general manager and general manager of PetroChina’s parent company, CNPC.

Through Zhou’s influence, Wang was promoted quickly through the CNPC ranks. From 2001–2006, Wang was senior vice president of PetroChina. In 2009, he became president of the Daqing Oil Field Limited-Liability Company. In 2011, he was appointed PetroChina vice president, a position he held until August 2013, when the investigation into his corrupt activities was officially announced.

In March 2014, PetroChina was investigated for dubious land purchases. The investigation revealed that, from 2008–2013, PetroChina spent 153.63 billion yuan ($25 billion) on foreign assets and 1.48 trillion yuan ($241 billion) on capital expenditures. Today, in response to corruption allegations and the need to offset price declines and losses, the company is in the process of asset restructuring.

In June 2014, three months after the investigation into PetroChina’s land purchases began, Wang was expelled from the CCP. On March 23, 2015, he was officially charged with taking bribes, holding unidentified property and abuse of power. In July 2015, Wang stood trial and on October 13, 2015, Hubei Province’s Xiangyang Intermediate Court sentenced him to 20 years in jail for corruption. The sentence was handed down one day after other top Zhou allies, Jiang Jiemin and Li Chuncheng, met similar fates. Wang was found guilty of possessing 42.5 million yuan ($6.7 million) in unaccountable assets. The court also found Wang guilty of dealings under the direction of Jiang Jiemin that led to extreme losses to state interests.

Described as a “shadowy figure,” Zhou Bin used his father’s position in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and the CNPC to build a massive commercial empire. Following Zhou Yongkang’s sentencing, the official Xinhua statement cited that wife Jia Xiaoye and son Zhou Bin took over 129 million yuan ($20 million) in bribes during the elder Zhou’s tenure.

Zhou Bin often used his wife’s or mother-in-law’s names to obscure his involvement in financial deals. According to a NYT investigation, only one of the thirty-seven companies belonging to family members appeared in Zhou Bin’s name: Beijing Zhongxu Yangguang Petroleum and Natural Gas Technology, Ltd.

This company is an example of how ownership is transferred among family members. On April 20, 2004, Zhou Bin registered Beijing Zhongxu Yangguang Petroleum and Natural Gas Technology, Ltd. using his mother-in-law’s address in the Huating Jiayuan Building (華亭嘉園). During that same year, his mother-in-law, Zhan Minli, paid 4 million yuan ($483,284) to buy 80% of the company’s shares. Thereafter, Zhan served as a legal front for her son-in-law until December 2009, when she transferred 16 million shares to Zhou Bin, making him Zhongxu’s largest shareholder.

In February 2010, the company changed its name to Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology, Ltd. Corp. (also known as Sun Rising Energy Technology Co.), increasing the registered capital to 20 million yuan ($2.93 million). Zhou Bin served as chairman until December 2012, when he yielded his position to his wife. As of August 2014, Zhou Bin remains the largest shareholder.

In 2009, as majority owner and chairman, Zhou Bin oversaw the sales of technology systems to major provincial branches of CNPC, leveraging his father’s former position to secure major contracts. According to the company profile, Zhongxu built and managed 8,000 CNPC gas stations – 40% of the company’s gas stations in China. In 2011, Zhongxu was also CNPC’s largest industrial-electronics supplier. While these sales came after his father’s tenure at CNPC, they occurred while Zhou Yongkang’s ally, Jiang Jiemin, was CNPC chairman.

In early 2013, Zhou Bin fled to the United States after an ally within the security sector tipped him off about his impending arrest warrant. But in December 2013, he returned to China and was detained. On July 29, 2014, Caijing reported that Zhou Bin was formally arrested for “involvement in illegal business operations.” As of publication, no trial date has been set.

When asked about the numerous companies in her name, Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law responded, “Do I look like I own oil?” But on paper, Zhan is a major shareholder in companies, including Beijing Hai Tian Yong Feng Oil Sales, Shaanxi De Gan Oil Technology, Beijing Hui Sheng Yang Guang Investment Management (in which she is the controlling shareholder), and Beijing Hao Sheng Yi Jia Investment Management (which records state she owns). She also had initial ownership of Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology Ltd., Corp. (Sun Rising Energy Technology Co.). When the company was established in 2004, she bought 80% of the shares for 4 million yuan ($483,284). In 2009, she transferred ownership to Zhou Bin. In December 2012, Zhou Bin’s wife succeeded him as chairman of Zhongxu.

In 2008, oil tycoon Wang Letian bought Shaanxi Degan Petroleum Technology Ltd, an oil company that Zhan Minli owned on paper. Upon closer examination, Shaanxi Degan Petroleum Technology has the same registration address as Zhou Bin’s Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology Ltd., Corp. and his college roommate’s Shaanxi Qiuhai Jiqing Petroleum Science and Technology Co.

Wang bought the company at the inflated price of 550 million yuan ($75.67 million) in order to gain exploration rights to the Degan and Changyin oil fields. According to records reviewed by Caixin, Zhou Bin only paid 20 million yuan ($2.75 million) for the original purchase sometime between 2007–2008. Wang then discovered that only 13 square kilometers of the 50 square kilometer area could be tapped. The rest of the land was held by subsidiaries of Changqing Oilfield and had been fraudulently sold to him by Zhou Bin.

In interviews with the Wall Street Journal and New York Times, Zhan denied knowledge of the deals conducted in her name. Zhan claimed that, in China, it is common for mothers to own assets on behalf of their children.

Zhan Minli (Mary Zhan) and her husband Huang Yusheng (Steve Huang) now live in the U.S. and are U.S. citizens. Currently, they own two properties in Orange County, CA. They also incorporated two companies in the United States, Hysco Corporation and Newrun International, both listed at their home address. The two companies sold North American oiling equipment to CNPC and other Chinese oil firms. Both were liquidated on July 9, 2013.

Fiona Huang is a U.S. citizen, who emigrated from China in the late 1980s with her father, Huang Yusheng (Steve Huang). Fiona is the granddaughter of Huang Jiqing, a famous Chinese geologist best known for his role locating lucrative oil and gas fields. Zhou Bin and Fiona met while he was attending the University of Texas at Dallas in the early 1990s.

Once Zhou Bin and Fiona Huang returned to China in 2001, the couple lived in an apartment purchased under mother-in-law, Zhan Minli’s (Mary Zhan) name in the Huating Jiayuan Building. In 2004, the same address was used to register Zhou Bin’s company, Zhongxu Yangguang Petroleum and Natural Gas.

Once the couple returned to Beijing, they purchased Unit 28 of Silver Lake (Yinhu) Villa on Rainbow Road, which they sold for 38 million yuan ($60 million) in 2012. In addition, Zhou Bin owned another villa property at the Tang Dynasty Complex (觀唐別墅) worth approximately 20 million yuan ($3.1 million). There are no records indicating the original purchase prices or the sources of income that made these purchases possible.

The same powerful family connections allowed Fiona to create a television/film production company without any related professional background. As the daughter-in-law of the country’s security czar, Fiona easily gained permission to film a TV show called “Police Story.” She also received funding for her show by the Ministry of Public Security’s office in Chongqing City, which was then headed by Zhou Yongkang’s political ally, Bo Xilai. One South China Morning Post source described the series as “a propaganda piece to boast about the exploits of the police.”

In October 2013, the Financial Times reported that Fiona had fled to the United States. However, in September 2014, it was reported that Fiona had returned to China and was placed in detention while officials continued her investigation. Her husband, Zhou Bin, has also been detained by officials for engaging in illegal business activities. Their five-year-old daughter has reportedly been placed in the care of a Beijing kindergarten.

In 2001, Zhou Yongkang married CCTV reporter Jia Xiaoye. Soon after, her older sister Jia Xiaoxia (aka Margaret Jia) was appointed to CNPC positions in Ecuador and Canada. She also worked on projects in Venezuela and Sudan. Although she had no background in oil companies, she became general manager of CNPC International Canada in 2006. CNPC sources state that the position was merely a nominal title. In reality, Li Zhiming, CEO of Brion Energy Corp (PetroChina’s Canadian subsidiary), was in charge of the Canadian operations.

In July 2014, Margaret Jia was suddenly replaced. According to the Wall Street Journal, Jia’s replacement coincided with the corruption investigation of Li Zhiming. Li was arrested in late June 2014, after he negotiated the $1.23 billion acquisition of the Dover oil sands project from Canadian company Athbasca Oil Corp. Due to Li’s sudden arrest, the timeline of the project’s final negotiation and payments were suspended until March 2015 as the CNPC subsidiary in Canada deals with the sudden personnel change and corruption allegations.

Unlike his older brother, Zhou Han had no interest in leveraging his father’s influence to enrich himself. News reports consistently describe Han as distancing himself from Zhou, particularly after 2000 when his mother died in a fatal car accident. (Rumors suggest that Zhou Yongkang orchestrated the hit-and-run shortly after their divorce was finalized.) Zhou Han works at CNPC’s oil and gas distribution center in Beijing and keeps a low public profile.

In 2014, Caixin quoted an unnamed villager from Zhou Yongkang’s hometown, who stated that the Zhou family was financially secure when Zhou was at CNPC but became even richer when he transitioned to Sichuan politics. Using his brother’s connections, Yuanqing was known to peddle influence among local officials in Wuxi, the family’s hometown. His wife, Zhou Lingying, used her business background to fully take advantage of Zhou Yongkang’s influence.

Officially retired since 2001, Zhou Lingying built a career as a private businesswoman. She has pursued business interests in mining, firefighting equipment, oil field equipment, and gas stations, using her brother-in-law’s status as business leverage.

Lingying’s oil interests intersected with Zhou Yongkang’s tenure as a high-level official at CNPC and Shengli Petroleum Administration, a subsidiary of state-owned Sinopec. In 1992, while Zhou Yongkang was CNPC deputy general manager, Lingying was appointed manager of a county-level state-owned enterprise (SOE), Wuxi County Commercial Goods Co. The company quickly acquired gas stations in Wuxi and boasted Shengli Petroleum Administration as a client. Zhou Yongkang had served as Shengli Petroleum’s director general two years earlier.

In 2004, Lingying and her son, Zhou Feng, began expanding their business interests to mineral and geological exploration services. According to a 2014 tally by Caixin, the mother and son duo invested approximately 400 million yuan ($66.09 million) in 20 companies.

In 2007, a few weeks after Zhou Yongkang was appointed to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, mother and son established Beijing Honghan Investment Co., an umbrella company. Beijing Honghan created companies that worked with local CNPC subsidiaries, such as Qinghai Oilfield Water Recycling Co. Lingying’s Audi dealership (Jiangyin Benyue Automobile) also worked with CNPC’s Kunlun Energy through Wuxi Zhongyou Kunlun Energy, an intermediary company that the two companies co-founded in November 2012. Kunlun Energy Chairman Li Hualin, who previously served as Zhou Yongkang’s aide during his years as CNPC deputy general manager, was later investigated for corruption in August 2013.

On February 9, 2015, Liu Han, former chairman of mining conglomerate Sichuan Hanlong Group and his brother, Liu Wei, were executed for illegal gang activities. Sichuan Hanlong Group is the largest private enterprise in Sichuan and Han’s personal wealth was estimated in the billions.

Liu leveraged his business network by serving as deputy chairman of Sichuan’s General Chamber of Commerce. He also created networks within the party as a member of Sichuan’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, bribing members of the political advisory body during his three terms. According to one report, Liu’s organization was “harbored and indulged by government officials.” Radio Free Asia’s Mandarin service described Liu as Zhou’s right hand in society and the underworld, and Zhou as Liu’s right hand in politics.

Liu’s trial preceded Zhou Yongkang’s investigation and was watched closely for signs that Zhou would be implicated. Ultimately, Liu did lay the groundwork. In his court testimony, Liu stated that he invested $150 million in mutually beneficial business deals with the provincial senior leaders (lingdao) who reported to party secretary Zhou Yongkang.

Liu Han also had business ties with Zhou Yongkang’s oldest son, Zhou Bin. In 2003, Liu purchased the younger Zhou’s tourism company for 12 million yuan ($1.45 million) – at least 6 million yuan ($725,000) over the actual value. Zhou Bin then helped Liu secure 600 million yuan ($72.5 million) in bank loans for his Sichuan hydropower plant, Xingding Power Co. Zhou also bought 20% of Xingding’s shares, helping Liu skirt new environmental regulations that blocked full ownership. Zhou later returned his shares to Liu, gratis. In 2013, Liu sold Xingding to state-owned China Power Investment Corporation for 2.15 billion yuan ($259.77 million). One year later, government auditors began scrutinizing the deal.

In the end, Liu believed that his political network would shield him from investigation and provide prosecutorial immunity. Ironically, it was an investigation into Zhou Bin that led investigators to Liu. On February 20, 2014, Xinhua revealed that Liu’s case had been driven by the CCP’s Central Committee. The news report signaled the top leadership’s intent to prosecute all corrupt individuals in Zhou Yongkang’s network.

Liu Han was sentenced to death in May 2014. He filed for an appeal but was rejected three months later. Liu’s family members were allowed one final visit before his execution in February 2015.

Through business associate Wu Bing (also known as Wu Yongfu and Li Ruochen), affiliates of Zhou Bin’s Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology Ltd. Corp. (Zhongxu Industry and Zhongxu Investments) were able to invest heavily in the Sichuan Province, where the elder Zhou served as party secretary from 1999 until his election to the Politburo in 2002. In 2006, Zhongxu Industry secured a 5.3 billion yuan ($834.5 million) contract to build the Longtoushi Hydroelectric Station. Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law also invested in the power plant through her company, Sichuan Tianyun Industry Investment Co. Ltd. The power plant opened in 2008 and reported annual revenues of approximately 900 million yuan ($141.7 million).

Despite Zhan Minli denying any knowledge of business deals in her name, Zhou Bin’s college roommate, Mi Xiaodong, helped Zhou’s mother-in-law secure large-scale real estate deals. Court documents show that Zhou Bin and mother-in-law Zhan had a lucrative partnership with Kaisa Group Holdings and Fantasia Holdings Group. Kaisa Group was founded by Guo Yingcheng (also known as Kwok Yingshing), who allowed more than a dozen of his family members to freely become involved in property deals and ultimately resigned on December 31, 2014 amid suspicions of corruption. A New York Times report notes that Kaisa’s woes may have been tied to a Chengdu land deal that involved Zhou Yongkang’s family members. By January 2015, both real estate companies suffered from either sales suspensions or asset freezes.

According to a February 2014 Beijing News report that was quickly deleted by censors, Mi Xiaodong and Zhan Minli used a newly formed front company called Qiuhai Xurong Real Estate Development in 2009 to gain development rights to a 2,000-unit Beijing public housing apartment. The company had 30 million yuan ($4.40 million) in registered capital. One year later, Mi and Zhan sold their majority share, raising suspicions that they used Zhou Bin’s influence to buy at a deep discount, and then sell for a significant profit.

The two college roommates also shared the same business registration address for their separate companies. On September 6, 2007, Mi Xiaodong registered a Beijing office for his company, Shaanxi Qiuhai Jiqing Petroleum Science and Technology Co. at Suite 603, Fifth Floor, Building No. 1, No. 6 East Futong Street, Chaoyang District, Beijing. Conveniently, the address of Zhou Bin’s Zhongxu Yangguang Energy and Technology was only three doors down at Suite 606 of the same building. Then in 2007, Mi bought the East Futong property on behalf of Zhou Bin’s mother-in-law for 1.155 million yuan ($147,773). On September 19, 2009, at least eight offices (including suites 603 and 606) were registered in Zhan Minli’s name.

In October 2013, after being identified as the “white glove” or legal front for Zhou Bin, Mi was detained by disciplinary officials. As of publication, Mi Xiaodong’s investigation is ongoing.

During the 1990s, Cao Yongzheng rose to prominence for the alleged ability to predict people’s futures and cure terminal ailments. The spiritual healer built an extensive network among senior officials, including former Sichuan deputy party secretary Li Chuncheng, former Sichuan vice governor Guo Yongxiang, and former CNPC chairman Jiang Jiemin. According to a BBC report, Zhou Bin introduced his father to Cao sometime in 2000. Cao is also said to have earned Zhou Yongkang’s trust when he began mentoring Zhou’s estranged eldest son, Zhou Han.

During Zhou Yongkang’s secret trial in May 2015, Zhou was accused of passing one “confidential” and five “extremely confidential” documents to Cao in direct violation of the State Secret Law. Furthermore, the court judgment states that Zhou instructed Jiang Jiemin and Li Chuncheng (who were known clients of Cao) to “assist in the business activities of others.” As a result, these unnamed associates, including Cao Yongzheng, illicitly acquired approximately 2.14 billion yuan ($336 million).

In addition to Zhou’s family, Cao’s connection to other high-level officials allowed him entry into other lucrative business ventures. In 2005, Cao formed a partnership with Wang Guoju, a former CNPC official at the Shengli oil field where Zhou Yongkang served as director general and party secretary in the late 1980s. They set up Nindai Energy Development Company in Hong Kong. The company had 50 million yuan ($6.04 million) in registered capital and operated businesses ranging from technology consulting for oil and gas development to coal mining and logistics. In 2007 and 2008, Niandai signed lucrative contracts with CNPC to develop oil projects in the Xinjiang and Jilin provinces. The contract stipulated that Niandai Energy would invest in early exploration and develop facilities, entitling them to share revenues with CNPC once production began.

In 2012, Cao Yongzheng transferred control of Niandai Energy to his brother Cao Yongping. Documents show that the company received investment earnings of 270 million yuan ($42.4 million) without fulfilling any of their contractual obligations.

In July 2013, police raided Niandai Energy’s Beijing headquarters and froze the company’s bank accounts. According to Caixin, all Niandai Energy assets, including the company’s oil fields and project earnings, were seized. In 2014, CCDI officials detained Cao after he fled to Taiwan.

Court records confirmed that Cao testified against Zhou Yongkang during his secret one-day trial on May 22, 2015.